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Spencerism and the Causal Theory of Reference1 
 
Abstract 
Spencer’s heritage, while almost a forgotten chapter in the history of biology, lives on in 
psychology and the philosophy of mind. I particularly discuss externalist views of meaning, 
on which meaning crucially depends on a notion of reference, and ask whether reference 
should be thought of as cause or effect. Is the meaning of a word explained by what it refers 
to, or should we say that what we use a word to refer to is explained by what concept it 
expresses? I argue for the latter view, which I call “Darwinian”, and against the former, 
“Spencerian” one, assuming conceptual structures in humans to be an instance of adaptive 
structures, and adaptive relations to an environment to be the effect rather than the cause of 
evolutionary novelties. I conclude with the deficiency – both empirically and 
methodologically – of a functionalist study of human concepts and the languages they are 
embedded in, as it would be undertaken in a paradigm that identifies meaning with reference 
or that gives reference an explanatory role to play for what concepts we have. 
 
1. Introduction: Function and Genesis 
I will consider a pair of theses about concepts, locating the notion of a concept in a rather 
broad and biological context: every species has certain abilities dependent on certain internal 
cognitive resources, and concepts in particular. Thus, e.g., both human and non-human 
primates represent numerical content, communicate, and form social relations, all of which 
depends on certain concepts. But no matter what training effort is made, all and only humans 
have the full concept of an integer, develop a ‘theory of mind’ depending on a repertoire of 
mental state concepts, and exhibit sensitivity to phrase structures as underlying human 
language (see Carey 2004, Fitch and Hauser 2004).  
For each concept, then, that a species can form, we can ask about (i) its genesis (where 
it comes from, how it comes into existence), and (ii) how it functions (what it is used to refer 
to). While genesis and function seem distinct enough conceptually, we may well be tempted 
to explain the one in terms of the other. The following two theses capture this wide-spread 
temptation:  
(1) An organism O comes to have a concept, C, of some thing, X, because of 
functional relations that O takes up in relation to X.  
(2) How O’s concept, C, of some thing, X, functions in relation to X, is explained by 
how O came to have C.  
The first thesis explains the genesis of O’s internal concepts – where they come from or what 
brought them into being – by how they function or what they mean in an environment: 
function explains genesis. The second explains how a concept functions – what it means – 
from its genesis – or where it comes from: genesis explains function.  
I will deny both theses, but before doing that let me note that both sound quite natural. 
Take our concept of a doorknob, made famous through Fodor’s (1998) discussion of it. What, 
except for doorknobs, and how we related to them functionally or causally, could possibly 
explain why we come to have a concept of doorknobs (how that concept came into being)? In 
fact, that appears to be a basic empiricist intuition. And what if not where a concept comes 
from or how it arises should explain what doorknob, as we use that word, means or refers to 
(how it functions)? The opposing thesis I explore and defend is this: 
(3) The functional relations to some thing, X, that O takes up by virtue of some 
concept, C, do not explain how C comes into existence, and are not explained by 
how C comes into existence.  
                                                 
1 I am deeply obliged to two anonymous referees from B&P, and particularly the editor for their very useful 
comments. I am equally highly indebted to Maria E. Kronfeldner for effectively inspiring the whole project. 
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The first conjunct breaks a causal-explanatory path from function to genesis. While a 
concept’s adaptiveness (functionality) may explain why it is selected, maintained, or 
proliferated, it does not explain why it came into being, and hence exists. This thesis excludes 
a causal theory of meaning, if understood in the following terms. Let reference be a relation 
between a word and a thing in the world, understood as something that determines the 
meaning of the word. Suppose further a causal analysis of that notion of reference, on which 
the meaning of water, say, as based on that reference will arise from our causal relations to 
water – the substance found in our environment on earth. On this view, the latter and how we 
relate to it will decide what our word water means, or what concept it expresses.  
Again this view is intuitively plausible, for one should think that were it not for the 
existence of water, how we deal with it and are causally affected by it, we would not have 
come to have our concept of water. Hence our standing in these relationships to water, the 
substance, is surely at least a necessary condition for our coming to possess the concept of 
water; one might even be inclined to go for the stronger view that it is sufficient (where else 
are such concepts supposed to come from, one might ask). But the third thesis suggests that 
this is a non sequitur: while there is an important connection between meaning (concepts) and 
referential function, the latter is not explanatory for the former; and how our word water 
functions in respect to water, the substance, may not even be a necessary condition for the 
origins of that concept, hence our having it (although it is, trivially, a necessary condition for 
it to function as it does). We might come to live in an environment in which there was no 
water, or even a similar-looking substance. Then there is no more reason that we would not 
have the concept of water (leaving aside the question of whether we had been alive in this 
environment), than there is for a cave-dwelling animal that never sees the light not to actually 
have eyes.  
While that analogy points to standard cases of “Darwinian theft”, I will argue that 
there may be a deeper reason why water, the substance, and relations to it may not be 
necessary for the origins of our concept of water. There are general arguments from the 
structure of Darwinian evolutionary theory that not only break the explanatory path from 
function to organismic structure, but according to which structures may be said to have 
functions even though these were never enacted in the creature’s phylogenetic past. That a 
concept can be used to talk about water, the substance – could function in that fashion – is, on 
the same grounds, neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the concept to come into 
existence (see section 2).  
The other half of the conjunctive claim (3) states that how a concept came into being 
need not explain how it functions with respect to an environment and things occurring in it. 
This viewpoint should be familiar from a Darwinian perspective, since in the latter the 
functioning of any given organismic structure that enters the evolutionary scene may vary. 
Which function(s) it will come to subserve in its evolutionary history will depend on 
accidents of a multifarious and unpredictable kind. Evolution has no foresight and often 
proves weird. The story of the jawbone is a famous example (and no exceptional case). We 
see it being used for cracking in reptiles, but also for hearing in mammals, and with other 
functions still. What function does it, as such or as a particular organismic structure, subserve 
intrinsically?2 The question seems to have no factual answer, and in this sense, there is no 
intrinsic connection between structure and function. A given structure may have multiple 
functions, and it has these functions usually not as an isolated structure, but as a part of some 
functional whole, so that it is unclear to what the function should be ascribed. There may be a 
                                                 
2 I here understand function to mean “selected effect” function. On the understanding of function as “causal role” 
as conceived by Amundson and Lauder (1994), the relation between a structure and its function is equally not 
intrinsic, and in a more obvious way: the notion of function plays no explanatory role, it is nothing that is 
independent from the structure as some given “purpose” of it, relative to which it can then be rationalized (ibid., 
234-6). 
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single function associated with a given structure and no change of it, but even that may be for 
some accident of history, and the function will still not be something given when the genesis 
is given, or determined by it. Of course, the same function may also be subserved by 
anatomically very different structures.  
The view denied in (3) is not, I will argue, “Darwinian”, but, as I will say, 
“Spencerian”. Far from having been superseded by the history of biology, the Darwin-
Spencer dichotomy seems strangely alive in current thinking about human meaning and mind. 
While in the biology of “bodily” function, Spencerism is little more than a forgotten chapter 
in the history of biology, in the study of “mental” function it remains a success story, even 
long after the days of behaviorism have passed. A long sequence of externalist views of 
meaning suggests that meaning is a matter of external function and causal relations: meaning, 
it is thought, just cannot predate its use in referring. It is bootstrapped from reference, consists 
in the latter. Why this methodological dualism with respect to the two domains, the “mental” 
and the “physical”? On a unified view, if the environment cannot cause organic adaptive 
structures to come into existence, it cannot bring concepts into existence. Indeed, for the rest 
of this paper, I will suppose that “mental” and “physical” will be no more than informal labels 
picking out empirically different domains for theoretical inquiry, with no implications for 
either ontology or method. 
  
2. The Darwin-Spencer Divide 
 
The assessment above regarding Darwin and Spencer may seem surprising in the light of 
Dennett (1995) calling Spencer “an important clarifier of some of Darwin’s best ideas” (p. 
393). These ideas, for Dennett, appear to be Darwin’s theory of evolution as such, for what he 
criticizes in Spencer’s account are their social-Darwinist applications. “Spencer was a 
Darwinian – or you could say that Charles Darwin was a Spencerian”, we read, and also: “the 
modern synthesis is Spencerian to its core” (ibid., 394). As a self-confessed “good Spencerian 
adaptationist”, Dennett adopts Godfrey-Smith’s “Environmental Complexity Thesis” (ECT), 
according to which “there is complexity in the organism in virtue of complexity in the 
environment” (ibid., 395; see Godfrey-Smith 1998).  
Spencer presumably defended a strong version of this paradigmatically externalist 
claim, to the effect that environmental complexity is both necessary and sufficient for organic 
complexity. Godfrey-Smith opts for its mere necessity – a claim I have already said I will 
deny – and proposes, more precisely, to understand the ECT as a thesis about the function of 
cognition and its evolutionary rationale, in the teleonomic sense of function: cognition 
evolved for the sake of enabling the agent to deal with environmental complexity. While that 
appears as an answer to a “why”-question – it aims to explain why cognition exists in the first 
place, by appeal to a notion of what it is “for” – the thesis can also be read as an 
empirical/explanatory claim (which it was in Spencer’s version of it): structural complexity 
outside causes/explains structural complexity inside.  
Note that thus understood, human language, to which I will repeatedly return, would 
seem a particularly unpromising start for the ECT. If the ECT had its way, externalist 
structures in the environment should predict or at least stand in some systematic relation to 
the core structural properties we can empirically attest in the workings of the computational 
system underlying human language. To my knowledge, little evidence suggests this, as long 
as one accepts standard textbook accounts of that system (see e.g. Culicover 1997, and see 
sections 4 and 7).3 At the same time, the case in question shows that more than the mere 
                                                 
3 Language is created by children in the absence of a “language model”, or linguistic structure in the 
environment. See Goldin-Meadow (2003), and Yang (2002) for a state of the art account of language acquisition. 
None of the points in the text is to say that the ECT does not have a reading under which it is “obviously true”, 
as Neander (1997: 567-8) claims, who considers it as “trivial” as the claim that “circulation is for transporting 
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necessity of environmental complexity for the origin of the internal structures would have to 
be invoked in defending an externalism as underlying the ECT, since otherwise even the 
strongest internalist, such as Chomsky (2000), need not disagree: there surely are various 
physical and environmental preconditions that are necessary for the language faculty to 
evolve phylogenetically and mature ontogenetically. 
Irrespective of the particular case of human language, Godfrey-Smith agrees that the 
“critical feature of a Darwinian mechanism is that the variants produced do not bear a 
systematic relation to the environmental factors that exert selective pressure on the organism” 
(Godfrey-Smith 1998: 87). Looking at the matter with Darwinian eyes, indeed, at least the 
origins of organic complexity have not much to do with what the latter is “for”. For Darwin 
but not Spencer, the environment is silent on matters of design. It does not act on the 
organism so as to mold it and confer structural complexity to it, or so as to create adaptations. 
Darwinian environmental selection is like a spectator sport: choosing among forms that 
present themselves, as a consequence of which these forms get redistributed in following 
generations. The evolutionary process works with forms that are already there, and have an 
internal cause in random (undirected) mutations: they occur with no preferred orientation in 
adaptive directions. Natural selection itself is “blind” in a similar way: it does not see into the 
adaptive future.4  
In short, nothing is there because of what leads it to be selected, or because of what it 
is useful for (even though much is not any more there because of what it was not useful for).5 
At least in this sense, then, there is, for the Darwinian, no direct transfer or induction of 
structure, a direct causal or explanatory path from environmental complexity to internal 
structure. By crediting the environment with a more “active” role in structuring the organism, 
Spencer falls on the Lamarckian side in the Darwin-Lamarck-divide, with direct 
                                                                                                                                                        
blood around the body”. Even such “trivialities” regarding the externalist’s notion of what something is “for” 
may be unavailable for human language, though. All species communicate, but the specific way in which we do 
does not seem to explain specific linguistic structures. Possibly, mechanisms allowing language processing 
evolved irrespective of their later use in the human communication system (Hauser et al. 2002, Fitch and Hauser 
2004). It remains unclear today what theoretical and practical purpose some identification of the “function of 
language” serves (see further Chomsky 2003b: 312-3). For a doubt on the coherence of the externalism entailed 
by the ECT see also Sterelny (1997). 
4 On the so-called “statistical” interpretation of evolutionary theory (Walsh et al. 2002), moreover, it is a theory 
about the structure of populations only, not a theory of “forces” acting on individual organisms (and hence not a 
theory about any “creative” forces, see the next fn.). Not applying to individual-level phenomena, natural 
selection does not offer explanations of them. 
5 The view I am endorsing in this paragraph is not particularly controversial, if indeed “no version of Darwinism 
holds that natural selection explains how, against a given genetic background, a particular mutation which 
confers an advantage arises” (Godfrey-Smith 1998: 93). Still, there is of course an ongoing debate on whether 
natural selection has a creative role to play on the evolutionary scene. Thus, Neander (1995) argues that “natural 
selection has a creative and not merely distributive role to play” (ibid., p. 586), whereas, on the view above, the 
creative role is played by random mutations on the individual level alone. The “statistical” as opposed to the 
“dynamic” interpretation of evolutionary theory (fn. 6), supports the present view. Neander crucially appeals to 
the cumulativity of the adaptive process, in which some earlier preservations and proliferations of some co-
adapted sequence of genes changes the probability of what subsequent variations will arise. Still, natural 
selection cannot but influence what subsequent variations will “randomly arise” (Neander 1995: 586; my 
emphasis), no matter whether they occur with other probabilities on the population level, given a changed gene 
pool in which previous mutations took place. Neander’s argument, one might say, depends on mixing two 
“cycles of causation”. In a single-step selection process, as she points out, there is a “causal isolation” between 
each random/select sequence. Here the causal processes invoked are the organism-internal ones giving rise to a 
random mutation. In cumulative selection, she further argues, one random/select sequence is not causally 
isolated from the next. But, now, the notion of “causality” has widened and invokes the gene pool in which 
certain distributional shifts have taken place.   
That said, the whole issue about cumulativity is possibly orthogonal to the concerns of this paper. What 
explanatory role, if any, natural selection needs to play for the origins of human language is a widely open 
question (cf. Hauser et al. 2002); and as regards human concepts, if these are atoms in the sense of Fodor (1998), 
hence primitives, it is not clear how they should have arisen gradually by cumulative selection. 
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repercussions for his paradigmatically associationist psychology. Thus, Spencer took it for a 
law that  
“all psychical relations whatever, from the absolutely indissoluble to the fortuitous, are 
produced by experiences of the corresponding external relations; and are so brought 
into harmony with them” (Spencer 1855: 530).  
As Godfrey-Smith puts this view: “the environment brings about an organic change exactly in 
its own image” (1998: 86), a mechanism meant to account both for within-generation and 
across-generations change. Since variation is acquired for Spencer, by the direct causal flow 
of environment to organism, for the sake of an increasing optimization in the latter, there is a 
diminished importance for the process of selection, as what is there to be selected is already 
brought in harmony with environmental pressures.  
Spencer remained essentially uncompromising in his “Lamarckian” psychology 
throughout his life, despite certain concessions on the possibility of trial-and-error-learning in 
addition to classical conditioning (see Godfrey-Smith 1998: 88-92). Only the former form of 
learning can be termed “Darwinian”, in that new variants are produced randomly or 
spontaneously. Spencer’s hyper-externalism radicalizes Lamarckism, in fact, in that the 
Lamarckian organism’s “creative response to felt needs” – as when the giraffe stretches for a 
longer and longer neck to reach up to the treetops – is now itself thought to be molded by the 
environment. Lamarck by contrast crucially appealed, internalistically, to drives towards 
adaptive complexity (“inherent tendencies”, “innate proclivities”) as well. But these must 
come from somewhere, Spencer (and Dennett 1995) would object here, and the environment 
is meant to turn that trick, too. 
There is a caricature of Lamarck, according to which, as Gould puts it, “a giraffe felt a 
need for a long neck, stretched ever so hard, and then passed the results of these successful 
efforts directly to its offspring” (Gould 2002: 179). An analogy to this caricature in 
psychology would be this: a human, feeling the need to name a certain – given, yet nameless 
– kind by a concept, thought ever so hard, came up with a suitable concept, and passed it on. 
The Darwinian response to that caricature would be that no need for a new concept will as 
such bring it into existence.  
While Lamarckism in biology is nowadays regarded as factually wrong, if not 
necessarily (Dawkins 1983), its analogy in psychology is much alive: in particular, if 
ontogenetic learning is conceived as an “instructive” rather than a “selective” process, it is the 
sort of direct flow of structure or information from the environment to the organism that 
Darwin denied.6 The classical case would be Skinner’s (1969) theory of learning as an 
accumulation of learned habits or operants. Dawkins (1983: 20-23) however argues that 
learning, if understood as adaptive improvement, must in principle be supported by and 
depend on an independent Darwinian selective mechanism as well. Structure in the organism 
may be induced, but none of these changes are intrinsically adaptive. As long as explaining 
progressive evolution is our goal, Dawkins’ argument shows it is not coherent to merely add a 
Darwinian mechanism of evolution to an independently operative Lamarckian one. 
In fact, Lamarckian instructive views of learning create a basic and unresolved 
paradox: it seems inconceivable that a human could “stretch for a concept it lacks”. The 
                                                 
6 As pointed out by Jerne (1967) (see also Piattelli Palmarini 1989 and Gazzaniga 1992), the history of biology 
provides many examples for a move from instructive models to selective models of some particular 
phenomenon. In the concrete case of the immune system that Jerne was primarily concerned with, it had been 
argued that, in the light of the immense numbers of antigens that existed in the environment, an organism could 
not possibly hold a stock of antibodies perfectly “adapted” to them. Still, it is now thought that an animal  
“cannot be stimulated to make specific antibodies, unless it has already made antibodies of this 
specificity before the antigen arrives.” (Jerne 1967: 201). 
What is relevant here is Jerne’s point that a given environmental problem as such does not tell us about its 
possible solutions. Indeed nothing is a problem, “objectively”, unless the organism has the conceptual resources 
to deal with it or grasp it as such, or has a conception of its possible solutions (cf. Piattelli Palmarini 1989: 13).  
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problem in its Ancient Socratean formulation, is not one about species-specific restrictions on 
what concepts each individual can possess (or how a monkey should come up with the 
concept of an integer, if by its nature it is incapable of that concept). The problem, as Jerne 
(1967) saw it, is that if you do not know what you are looking for, lacking the relevant 
concept, you can neither look for it nor find it. To look for it, you have to know what you are 
looking for, which by hypothesis you don’t, lacking the relevant concept. You also cannot 
find it, for lacking the relevant concept you would not recognize that it was the solution to 
your problem.  
In the reformulation of this classical problem by Fodor, it runs as follows. Suppose 
you wish to acquire a concept you lack, say the concept expressed by the word “red”, 
presumably a primitive concept.7 Suppose, too, that learning it would require an inductive 
process of hypothesis-formation and testing. If that is the case, you have, at some stage, to 
form the hypothesis that some object falls under the concept expressed by “red” by virtue of 
being red. But that is not possible, because by assumption you lack the concept involved in 
this hypothesis (cf. Fodor 1998: 124). In another formulation, you can only learn what you 
can represent with given conceptual resources, but not what requires more powerful 
structures than those in place.  
The internalist response to the paradox is that “learning concepts” is strictly speaking a 
misnomer and a child’s learning certain concepts at certain times in ontogenetic development 
will be no more than a mapping given phonetic labels to given representational resources that 
are in place at those developmental stages, resources that themselves originate on independent 
and internal grounds. E.g., on Yang’s (2002) model, learning grammars consists in discarding 
those grammars not matching environmental data (a form of “learning by forgetting”, see 
Mehler and Dupoux 1994). Similarly, it may be that concepts are basically in place and usable 
if triggered in relevant critical periods, though discarded if not selected by an environment.8 
The externalist and Spencerian response is also that the concepts are already there, but now 
they are supposed to be there in the environment; learning is the transfer of this structure to 
the organism.  I return to learning and its paradox in sections 5 and 6.  
Spencer, discarding the need for any internalist creative and non-functionally driven 
element in mental development, committed himself to show that the “mind, supposed passive, 
is moulded by its experiences of ‘outer relations’” (James 1880: 188), arguing that 
intelligence developed out of cumulative modifications through the direct influence of the 
environment: 
“The cohesion between psychical states is proportionate to the frequency with which 
the relation between the answering external phenomena has been repeated in 
experience.” (Spencer 1855, cited by James 1880: 184) 
That is, what we know is a function of what happened to us (or our ancestors). James objected 
to what he argued was “an obsolete anachronism, reverting to a pre-darwinian type of 
thought”. Instead, 
“new conceptions, emotions, and active tendencies which evolve are originally 
produced in the shape of random images, fancies, accidental out-births of spontaneous 
variation in the functional activity of the excessively instable human brain, which the 
                                                 
7 That is, a concept not decomposable into others on the basis of which it could be learned on a piece-by-piece 
basis together with a known mechanism of combination (such as syntax, or logic). Atomism for conceptual 
primitives will be assumed in what follows, a commitment any decompositionalist has to shoulder too, though 
she would assume a lesser number of primitives. See Fodor (1998), and also (Carey 1982: 47) for empirical and 
conceptual evidence against lexical decomposition. 
8 For some striking recent experimental evidence see Hespos and Spelke (2004); see also Carey (2004) for how 
given representational resources for numerical representation may remain unused. Carey offers a 
“bootstrapping” mechanism for avoiding the problem that we cannot learn what we cannot represent; she does 
not, however, show that, ever in the ontogeny of the human integer concept, a stronger representational resource 
is generated from a strictly weaker one. 
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outer environment simply confirms or refutes, adopts or rejects, preserves or destroys, 
- selects, in short (…).” (James 1880: 184) 
That picture is true, James sensibly concedes, for the “higher mental departments” only, as the 
lower ones are clearly not creative (or stimulus-insensitive, or non-input driven) in the sense 
James emphasizes: while there is (some) sense in which I am under the direct influence of the 
environment when I feel pain, say, there is no external or internal physical fact or 
configuration that, as far as we can tell, will force me to say or think anything in particular. 
On James’ “Darwinian” alternative to Spencer, then, an environment selects a concept 
for a use, but it does not create it, or shape the organism so as to let it have a concept where it 
lacked one before. There is evidently no denial of adaptation here, but there is a standard 
Darwinian denial that adaptation is a causal mechanism for the emergence of novel internal 
structure in the organism. Adaptedness is the long-term effect or result – indeed the necessary 
result – of environmental selection, but not a cause for it, as Spencer held. I will pursue this 
Jamesian internalist vision of concept possession for the rest of the paper, elaborating first on 
the meaning of “concept” as a theoretical term. 
3. Concepts 
On the Jamesian-Darwinian picture, the relation of content holding between an expression 
(e.g. word) and an object depends on (i) internally given structures the organism finds itself 
having, and (ii) an environment selecting among these structures, with the result of adaptively 
complex structures in the long term. The environment does not “produce” the internal 
structures (concepts); while intentional relations (what our thought and talk ends up being 
about) does depend on history and environmental causation, this needs to tell us nothing about 
the origin of concepts that figure in them. While this is unintuitive, it may be no more so than 
that the height of treetops and the need for high feeding should not cause giraffes to have long 
necks.  
Concepts, in my technical usage, then, will be internal structures in organisms that 
enable these organisms to take up certain functions. In the human case, they will play a role in 
referential acts, while not having reference intrinsically, which would be like saying that 
organic structures are intrinsically adaptive. This is not to say that concepts in the present 
sense are non-semantic, though, a point to which I will return. It is not the case, in particular, 
that just any of these internal structures could take up any referential function. A concept 
suited to refer to a person, for example, cannot be used to refer to a tree (as such). The 
standard externalist explanation for this fact would be that persons are not trees, and that this 
factual property of persons enters into our concept of persons, which we then, and because of 
what properties it is caused by, do not apply to trees. But here the internalist replies that the 
response is as plausible as the view that some creature, by being exposed to an environment to 
which it stands in causal relations, acquires some specific concept of it. Nothing in biology 
suggests that we acquire internal complexity by standing in causal relations, unless we have 
suitable internal structures for that to happen. There is no more reason for an Alien to acquire 
concepts of heat, houses or justice, when placed in an earth-bound environment, than there is 
for a rat to acquire concepts of beauty, pianos, or mental states.  
Concepts as here understood do not determine reference, nor do they originate from 
reference (i.e., functionally), though they enable a human to take up referential relations in a 
species-specific way, given a suitable environment. “Concept” is a functional notion in the 
intuitive sense that it enters into the explanation of the organism’s functioning. But that does 
not mean a concept is picked out relationally by appeal to what it is used for. Amundson and 
Lauder (1994: 234-5) argue that identifying the function of an organismic form or structural 
pattern does not, in the factual practice of evolutionary biology, depend on figuring out 
purposes or selected effects, and in fact not on any reference to the environment. Again, the 
“function” of the form may be what it is not used for, and never was: ecological experiments 
may have to be set up to elicit its possible functions, or how it can be used. If so, its 
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ecological function does not precede the structure and is no presupposition for our 
understanding of it. Concepts in the present sense cannot then be picked out by their actual 
use or content for the same reasons that organismic structures cannot necessarily be picked 
out or understood in terms of their actual use. They could be picked out by their possible 
content, or their semantic potential, but they are not explained by these latter notions either. 
In so viewing concepts I am departing from standard philosophical usage, where a 
concept is usually either (i) the intentional content of a mental representation structure, or (ii) 
a symbolic mental representation in the brain that intrinsically has such a content. In the first 
case, a concept is an intension (abstract object) or extension, in the second it is a syntactic 
object intrinsically relating to some external object or set-theoretic construct that it is “true 
of”.9 Concepts in the present sense have neither property. There is a connection between 
concepts in my sense and worldly extensions, in that the former are adaptive structures (they 
enable humans to make sense of the world). But they need not be caused by anything out 
there, and the connections in which they stand to external objects that exist and have causal 
properties are not intrinsic ones. In particular, even when functional, they do not necessarily 
track properties of the external world, as when we describe material things of the everyday 
world as solid and impenetrable, but physics tells us that these things consist of atoms that are 
mostly empty space. We still interpret the world in terms of categories like fire, earth, air and 
water, which are the Ancients’ four elements, even though only the last has turned out to 
denote a natural kind, and we know this. In the case of ordinary concepts like mind, fate, 
belief, gratitude, Chinese, the heavens, perfection, war, London, or city, we have essentially 
no idea how to pin down what the referents of these concepts out there are, and certainly it 
seems we cannot do so in a non-circular fashion, i.e. without re-using the concepts in 
question.10 I will henceforth denote concepts in the two standard senses above by means of 
the familiar CAPITALS, and use the word “concept” uncapitalized if I intend my own notion. 
Of course, none of the internalism above entails that how a given concept actually 
functions with respect to an environment can be determined empirically without looking at 
that environment. The actual functioning in the relational sense of “function” is nothing that is 
determined “in the head”, but this is trivially so, not substantively. What environment an 
organism is embedded in is not determinable by looking at internal structures in the organism, 
just as a Euro-detecting vending machine built in Germany does not as such determine 
whether it will detect German, Dutch, Italian, or Greek Euros. This will depend on its history, 
or where the machine is placed and how it is used. This kind of “externalism”, a truism, does 
nothing to imply the kind of “Spencerian” causal flow from the environment to the organism 
that I dispute.11  
                                                 
9 Note that in the case of the child’s putative concept of a possible language (on this see further section 7 below) 
there literally is nothing in the environment for that concept to be “true of” or to “apply to”: the structural 
patterns that this concept characterizes – phonetic, phonological and semantic mental representations, including 
the primes and relations making up these representations – are nowhere visible in the acoustic patterns that 
describe the outward physical side of language. It is widely argued, in particular, that the most basic syntactic 
categories – Noun and Verb – have neither a phonetic, nor a cognitive, nor a semantic or pragmatic rationale 
(Baker 2003 defines them in purely syntactic terms). Carstairs-McCarthy (1999; cf. 90, 161) provides an 
internalist, phonetic rationale for them.  
10 With respect to London, one might have hoped that it is clear what the referent is: a geographical place. But 
this tells us virtually nothing about how we use that word in referring to things. As Chomsky (2000) points out, 
London isn’t a place, for cities can be destroyed and rebuild at another spot, while remaining the same; 
moreover, cities are cultural and moral entities as well, viewed with or without their history; they are 
environments, as when we say they are polluted; and they can be all these things at the same time, as in the 
sentence London is so old, corrupt, and polluted that we should destroy and rebuilt it 100 miles away (see 
further Chomsky 2000, and Hinzen forthcoming).  
11 The Kripke and Putnam cases for an externalist view of content have equally no force against the present 
internalist view. Intentional relations depend on environmental causation (in the sense of selection), but they do 
not explain the concepts that figure in these intentional relations. The Twin-Earth story tells us something about 
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What brings it about that an organism with particular internal structures takes up 
intentional relations? This happens as a necessary consequence of embedding the organism in 
an environment to which its internal structures are suited in some ways rather than others, and 
better or worse so than other such structures. Intentionality does not explain the embedding of 
an organism in an environment and how it functions within it, for it is simply the embedding 
itself that will have various (and more or less successful) intentional relations as a result. 
These relations are enabled but not caused by the organism’s internal structures, and certainly 
they do not cause these internal structures. To say that they do, in the above analogy, would 
be like saying that our external use of the Euro-detector causes its internal mechanisms to 
exist, rather than depending on them.  
We may say, if we like, of our vending machine, that it has an internal structure (a 
concept) referring to Euros. But what exactly is this referent? As noted, the vending machine 
will have another “referent” in each country of the monetary union. We might save a 
theoretically interesting notion of reference by forming an equivalence class of objects in the 
extension of the internal structure, but this extension will contain not only different kinds of 
Euros, but a lot of other things than money (intelligently designed toy-Euros, say). There can 
be no objection to using such equivalence classes as the “semantic values” for internal 
concepts, but it seems clear that the resulting view of meaning will still be an internalist one, 
since it will be the internals of the machine or organism that will restrict and explain 
membership in the extension. We answer the question of which things are in that extension 
simply by noting which things do trigger the internal mechanism. A reference to the 
mechanism is crucial in delimiting the extension; hence the latter does not explain the former. 
Moving from vending machines to human infants, the story doesn’t change. Thus, we find out 
which range of possible languages the child’s innate knowledge of Universal Grammar (UG) 
permits, by looking at which languages factually do trigger the learning mechanism powered 
by UG (see further sections 4 and 7).  
External uptake of function and reference is thus, at the same time, an arbitrary and a 
non-arbitrary matter. Arbitrary, because the internal structure as such cannot determine the 
range of things to which it will actually be applied or with respect to which it will be used 
during its history; non-arbitrary, because the nature of the organism’s internal make-up will 
allow certain uses, while forbidding others. Again, to understand this restriction, we cannot 
look at the world. The world is not responsible for what concepts can mean (how they can be 
used); rather it is (partially) responsible for what they end up meaning (how they are factually 
used).  
4. Semantics from teleology 
Suppose that intentional relations to the world reduce to (i) structures in the organism, 
syntactically individuated, (ii) external entities, and (iii) causal relations between (i) and (ii). 
Call this the causal-externalist view of meaning. Concepts in the present sense, hence viewed 
as internal to the organism and as enabling it to take up certain referential acts rather than 
others, are not a part of this picture. In the absence of concepts-in-the-head playing this role, it 
must be symbols and their relations to the world alone that bootstrap meaning, are necessary 
and sufficient for it. Clearly, however, many things in the world, over and above the referent 
as such, may cause the occurrence of a mental representation having that referent as its 
content. Even though, for example, cow-skins are necessarily co-instantiated with cows 
                                                                                                                                                        
the possible uses of our concepts, nothing about why they exist. When being transferred to Twin-Earth without 
realizing it, our concepts will end up being used to refer to (what is, in one sense of the term “water”) non-water. 
That is as interesting as history gets. Equally, Kripke’s argument that Gödel remains Gödel even if we discover 
that he did not discover the Incompleteness Theorems, receives an internalist answer: it gives us an indirect 
piece of evidence about the nature of our concept of a person. The insight is that persons for us are not 
individuated by their scientific achievements. This does not explain why that is the concept it is (see further 
Hinzen forthcoming, a). 
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whenever they occur, humans of course distinguish the concepts of a cow and of a cow-skin. 
If human meaning is to remain a matter of causal and functional relations, one has to sieve out 
somehow those relations that do not intuitively constitute the meaning of a mental 
representation. The notion of a proper function has been thought to accomplish just this: the 
functions that are thought to explain and properly individuate meaning must be biological 
functions that the organism has been selected for.  
Specifically, then, our concept of a cow means cow rather than horse or donkey 
because indicating the vicinity of any of the latter is not its proper function: it is selected for 
being produced in the presence of all and only cows; in this case and this case only it 
functions in accordance with its purpose and design. But again we may notice that what is 
selected in a Darwinian context is a functional relationship that depends on concepts in the 
present sense being there, rather than causing these concepts. In the absence of the relevant 
concept in the organism, the presence of cows alone will not necessarily produce it; and if it 
does trigger it in a particular human at a particular time, we cannot predict or explain this 
from an independent or objective identification of the external stimulus, because we only 
know which stimulus we are talking about from the response itself that makes use of a certain 
concept: we might have responded by thinking “cow-skin”, and then we would have 
concluded that the stimulus supposedly controlling or producing this response was the skin 
(cf. Chomsky 1959). Most human concepts do not seem to be associated with particular 
adaptive functions in a way that they could be understood as reflexive response-mechanisms 
to independently given and identified environmental variables that cause or control them.12  
In the possibly more hopeful case of non-human concepts, say a frog’s neural 
representation of a fly, again many things will trigger the same response mechanism mediated 
by this representation, not just flies (inedible fly-imitations will do). But we may now take the 
wider ecological context into account and then point to what made the frog and its ancestors 
flourish as opposed to what did not, thereby finding reasons to distinguish among stimuli 
triggering what is in one clear sense the same response. Still, from this very conclusion we 
see that if we limit our attention to the internal structures of the organism and the frog brain’s 
representational powers, exactly the same mental representations or concepts are involved in 
responding to the flies and the fly-imitations (just as the internal mechanism of the Euro-
detecting machine does not become different when it, through some historical accident, 
comes to detect toy-Euros). No matter what wider ecological context and history we include 
in our picture of the frog, it won’t distinguish between different concepts in two such cases, 
and not explain the origin of the concept (in the present sense) that is involved. It does 
distinguish, though, quite trivially, among the different (human) CONCEPTS associated with 
these concepts. Which CONCEPTS a given concept comes to support depends of course on 
history, also on the present account.  
Generally speaking, we may regard adaptive functioning as setting a problem for 
biological explanation, rather than providing a solution. At times, describing adaptive 
functions may already be part of the answer: these are adaptationist explanations, which 
would then not only explain why some internal mechanisms is selected, but why it comes to 
exist in the first place. But their range of applicability is an empirical question and should not 
be rated as having the status of a default assumption, particularly not if we regard adaptation – 
with Amundson and Lauder (1994: 254), or G. C. Williams – as an “onerous” concept, appeal 
                                                 
12 As Hauser et al. remark, “[U]nlike the best animal examples of putatively referential signals [such as vervet 
monkey alarm calls, W.H.], most of the words of human language are not associated with specific functions (e.g. 
warning cries, food announcements) but can be linked to virtually any concept that humans can entertain. Such 
usages are often intricate and detached from the here and now. Even for the simplest words, there is typically no 
straightforward word-thing relationship, if ‘thing’ is to be understood in mind-independent terms.” (Hauser et al. 
2002: 1576) Cf. also fn. 15 above: it seems impossible to individuate e.g. a city in “objective” terms, i.e. in ways 
that do not depend on our concept of a city.     
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to which is a kind of last resort. That aside, it is not clear how these explanations would work 
in the case at hand, the case of concepts, given that the frog’s fly concept is precisely the 
same, no matter whether it has adaptive or maladaptive consequences (reacts to flies proper, 
or to fly-imitations whose digestion kills the frog).  
Papineau (2001) asks more generally what teleosemantics adds to our understanding 
of the nature of contentful states, and answers: “it tells us about the underlying nature of 
cognitive design, and thereby directs us to the past selectionist processes which fixed the real 
purposes of our cognitive parts” (p. 288). But as I want to argue in the rest of this section, 
there is no general reason why being so directed should help to understand the nature of 
cognitive design, or reveal anything about its “underlying nature”. It is an open and entirely 
empirical question what explanatory role natural selection, if any, has played in the 
emergence of human cognition and design.  
To illustrate this with our human knowledge of language, no one doubts that this 
particular competence evolved. Neither does anyone doubt that it “evolved by natural 
selection”, if this option leaves open, as it should, which evolutionary factors precisely have 
carried which explanatory weights in its evolutionary origins. Human language function is 
here again part of a problem for biological explanation, and a part of the current answer is 
Universal Grammar (UG). We may view UG as a structural type characterizing core 
knowledge of language present in humans and underlying their use of particular languages, all 
of which are variants of this type. We should note that speculations on evolutionary history 
have factually played no role in unearthing the generative principles characterizing UG. An 
adaptive rationale for UG has been stipulated long after it existed (Pinker 1994), and not 
indeed because the specific structures of UG posited on empirical grounds would empirically 
suggest an adaptive rationale (which indeed they do not, by and large; see Uriagereka 1998 
and Carstairs-McCarthy 1999 for discussion).  
UG as viewed in the biolinguistic tradition (Jenkins 2000, Anderson and Lightfoot 
2002) may thus rather be viewed as similar in nature to the “unities of type” of the rational 
morphologists of pre-Darwinian times, where they were taken to constrain the evolutionary 
process as independently explanatory generative principles, rather than being the results of it 
(on this interpretation of UG see further, Hinzen, forthcoming). By explaining commonalities 
of structure across widely divergent functionalities by appeal to a common ancestor of the 
several species that a given type was meant to unify, Darwin effectively subordinated the 
rational morphologists’ explanatory principle – the “unity of type” – to the functionalist’s – 
the “conditions of existence”. Still, Darwin found the unities of types well in place before 
declaring them common ancestors; and declaring them common ancestors will no doubt not 
explain these (Amundson 1998). More generally, there appears to be little reason to believe 
that the basic theoretical concept of the formalists, the concept of homology, only makes 
sense in the light of the crucial theoretical concept of the functionalists, the concept of 
adaptation.13  
By the same token, there is no reason, as of now, to follow the teleosemanticist’s 
advice, as presented by Papineau, and to presumptively look for “selectionist processes” as 
something that “fixed the real purposes of our cognitive parts”. We would be begging 
interesting empirical questions on what our design and its origin and rationale really are.  
 
5. Spencerian semantics at work 
Dretske (1988) develops the conflation of function and genesis into a whole explanatory 
framework. He centrally defends the claim that what our words or mental representations 
mean is a function of how they came to be, namely through “learning”. His theoretical goal is 
                                                 
13 See again Amundson and Lauder (1994: 243) against the hegemony of functional explanations; and see 
Amundson (1998) and Gilbert et al. (1996) on the return of the “unity of type”, a movement that has continued 
since. 
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“to install the informational processes underlying concept learning as the source of meaning 
and content” (Dretske 1994: 260), a goal that in turn subserves another, to show the 
intentional contents of the mind to be causally relevant in the explanation of behavior. 
Concepts, according to Dretske, flow naturally (without the mediation of intentional 
propositional attitudes) from our encounters with external environments. Behavior is strictly  
conditioned. It is not even a Lamarckian “creative” response to recurring situations, and even 
more clearly not a Darwinian selection of an independently originating internal structure.   
That the acquisition of a concept could not depend on anything other than learning, 
hence could not have an internal cause, is inconceivable for Dretske, as only its having an 
external cause in the sense of being appropriately conditioned, makes it acquire causal 
relevance in the explanation of behaviour:  
“(...) the content of beliefs and desires, of fears and intentions, the representational 
content that is featured in every explanation of behaviour by reasons, must derive from 
the development in learning of those circuits that constrain and structure voluntary 
action.“ (Dretske 1994: 262) 
To get intentional contents with causal relevance, one must “look to systems whose control 
structures are actually shaped by the kind of dependency relations that exist between internal 
and external conditions” (Dretske 1988: 95, my emphasis). Meaning is causally relevant to 
behaviour only in situations in which it is “associatively learned” (ibid., 96), by way of a 
“mechanical” response (ibid., 85): 
“By the timely reinforcement of certain output – by rewarding this output when, and 
generally only when, it occurs in certain conditions – internal indicators of these 
conditions are recruited as causes of this output.” (ibid., 98) 
But in a Darwinian frame of mind, Dretske’s insistance that internal structures subserving 
intentional behavior “must” derive from learning is the fallacy of conflating genesis and 
function: Darwin showed us how even the most perfect adaptedness of an organism to an 
environment does not require us to invoke Lamarckian shaping or environmental instruction. 
There is no inherent relation between adaptation and genesis, function and causal history, how 
something works and how it came to be. And of course there are standard empirical 
objections to Dretske’s need for learning, too: children know more than they can have learned 
from the kinds and amounts of inputs they receive, and what they know does not necessarily 
reflect what they hear (for a review of poverty of the stimulus arguments see Mehler and 
Dupoux 1994, Yang 2002, Anderson and Lightfoot 2002; for doubts about the significance of 
“associative learning” at large see also Gallistel and Gibbon 2001).  
The notion of “development in learning” as such, informally understood, may in 
principle involve any amount of creativity on the side of the organism. But this is clearly not 
allowed in the technical notion of learning employed by Dretske. The internal control 
structures that are acquired are supposed to crucially not depend on the organism’s active 
contribution and the internal resources it brings to bear on understanding, but instead on what 
they do mean or indicate about the external circumstances to which the organism’s behavior 
is appropriated during learning (cf. Dretske 1988: 88). As Dretske (1994: 260) points out, 
“[W]hat converts a physical state – some condition of the brain – into a belief is outside the 
head”. This latter assertion has a reading on which it is trivially true, for the embedding of an 
organism and its concomitant functioning in the environment in which it is placed is nothing 
that the organism causes. But this is not the reading Dretske intends, where the conceptual 
structures subserving intentionality are mechanically induced, as in empiricist learning 
theories more generally. My point is again that it is an empirical question, when we look at 
particular processes that we intuitively describe as “learning”, whether the process we look at 
is no more than the selection of a given neural structure, whatever its origin. Wherever this 
would be arguably true, we could still say that: 
 13
instances of a mental representation, R, carry information about instances of an 
external property, P, if “Ps and only Ps cause Rs” is a law, 
which is essentially how Fodor (1990: 57) summarizes Dretske’s approach. But these co-
variance relations would then merely indicate a result of an evolutionary process of natural 
selection and variation. As a result of this two-step evolutionary process, we do have 
reference, but the concepts that enable the latter would have a different cause.  
 By and large, the behaviourist view of meaning as deriving from associative learning 
or conditioning is as clear an expression of Spencerism as one can get. Dennett (1995) 
endorses this heritage unabashed (both the Spencerism and the behaviourism). Even Fodor 
(1990) is fully explicit that he regards Dretske’s as well as his own causal co-variance-
approach to meaning as continuous with that of Skinner. Skinner’s account of language 
acquisition reduces language learning to social reinforcements mediating alterations in the 
strength of verbal operants: an operant response comes under the control of a type of 
discriminative stimulus as a function of the frequency with which the response elicits 
reinforcement when produced in the presence of stimuli of that type. While Chomsky’s 
critique of this view, Fodor argues, has effectively demolished his learning theory, it does 
nothing against the semantics that went with it. This seems immediately problematic for a 
view like Dretske’s, where learning precisely is what grounds semantics, and the difference 
between a learning theory and a theory of meaning becomes moot. Fodor, by contrast, gives 
up on the learning theory, and focuses on what he calls a “Skinnerian” semantics, which he 
regards as independent of a learning theory. It is to this view that I now turn. 
 
6. Doing without learning 
 
On Fodor’s (1990) view, instances of the mental representation underlying the word dog 
denote dogs because the former are under the causal control of instances of dogs in the 
environment. This is still a theory of meaning that bootstraps meaning from reference, or 
explains the origin of concepts functionally, through causal relations. Fodor renounces 
behaviourism, of course, but for a wrong reason, from the present point of view. The Fodorian 
reason is that his Skinnerian theory of how meaning comes about is reformulated as a theory 
of the semantics of thoughts (“propositional attitudes”), the existence of which Skinner denied 
(Fodor 1990: 55). The advantage that Fodor claims for this reformulation is that while speech 
acts are actions, and it is plain that what we say is not a function of the situation we are placed 
in, what we think is no action in this sense. However, what I think in a situation seems no 
more a function of what is true in it than what I say in it, not least because what can happen in 
it from my point of view is a function of what thoughts I, as opposed to a monkey, say, can 
think. For a concern with Spencerism, what matters is not the view we take on the 
metaphysics of propositional attitudes, but the view we take on semantics. What the 
Darwinian is opposed to is the idea that concepts – rather than functional relations to an 
environment as based on such concepts – are causally or mechanically generated by an 
environment or the things within it.  
If the dependency between concepts and their external function is as I have stated it, 
extensions cannot be constitutive for concepts, as they remain also in Fodor’s later views. 
Which extension is supposed to determine the content of a concept can only be identified by 
looking at (understanding) the concept, hence is no cause of the concept. The present 
objection to Fodor’s account of concepts is thus that it provides a relational individuation of 
concepts. In fact, Fodor’s externalism is hard to square with his nativism. In Fodor (2001), 
Fodor considers a theory according to which the relational properties of “proto-concepts” 
(innate concepts, considered prior to being externally triggered), relations that he supposes to 
be constitutive for them, supervene on the proto-concepts’ (possibly unactualized) 
dispositions to enter into causal world-to-mind relations: “Maybe what makes a mental 
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representation a token of the proto-concept type CAT is its disposition to be triggered by cats” 
(Fodor 2001: 137). But when precisely am I disposed to react to cats by saying or thinking 
something involving the concept of a cat? I am only so disposed if I have the concept of a cat, 
so that there is something to be triggered in the first place, and indeed some appropriate thing 
(the concept of a mouse would not do).14 Hence, however concepts are individuated, they 
must be individuated independently of their dispositional relations to particular external 
objects. 
We face the same difficulty of combining a biological nativism with an externalist 
individuation of content in Fodor’s discussion of the learning paradox described in section 2. 
Fodor’s own (1998) response to the paradox is interestingly rather more in line with 
Spencer’s than Plato’s. Fodor starts by considering giving up on cognitivism, the view that 
concept acquisition involves a process of hypothesis-formation and testing, and stipulating 
instead that acquiring a concept is nomologically locking onto the property expressed by the 
concept. Internal operations of the mind – forming beliefs, testing of hypotheses, concepts – 
drop out of the process, and since these internal operations caused the problem in the first 
place, the learning paradox disappears. This moves us into an externalist direction of 
explanation, but the internalist response is predictable. Suppose indeed that having a concept 
is “resonating to” the property that the concept expresses. Then two questions arise: (i) what 
if not having the concept itself explains our resonating to the particular property expressed by 
it, rather than some other property (in which case the concept would not be explained by our 
resonating to the property)?; (ii) why the dualism of “concept”, on the one hand, and 
“property” expressed by it, on the other (the latter being a metaphysical notion with possibly 
no naturalistic status at all)? The concept cannot be explained by its relation to the property, 
since if we ask what property that is, we have to refer to the concept. 
While finding the above externalist and anti-cognitivist move attractive, however, 
Fodor himself raises the problem that even locking on to a property does ultimately not seem 
to be a process that is unconditioned internally. It clearly seems to depend on exposures to the 
right kind of things given in one’s experience: in particular, these typically being things 
falling under the concept to be learned. The concept of a doorknob is learned from exposures 
to (typical instances of) doorknobs, not giraffes or oysters, say. For Fodor this means that 
hypothesis-testing must be a part of the picture after all, for the learner has to use experiences 
with doorknobs to test and confirm hypotheses about what property the word “doorknob” 
denotes. Indeed, suppose the process of concept acquisition was not so cognitively mediated, 
or “brutely causal”. Then we would not predict that the concept of a doorknob is typically 
acquired from exposure to doorknobs and doorknobs and them only. But it is. Therefore the 
process is not brutely causal. In short, the relation between a concept and the experience from 
which it is learned or which it is “true of” is a special case of the evidential relation between a 
generalization and its confirming instances (Fodor 1998: 127, 132). 
But then again, ask just when an experience would be a confirming instance of a 
generalization formed over what the word “doorknob” expresses. Clearly, only if it was a 
doorknob. But this thought the learner cannot think, lacking the concept that figures in it. 
Thus hypothesis-testing is not involved, the internalist would conclude. The process in which 
a concept that originated on independent grounds is triggered must be “brutely causal”, and 
the doorknob/DOORKNOB problem raised is a reductio of the hypothesis-testing model. 
But why then is DOORKNOB acquired from doorknobs and not giraffes? The 
appearance may be as unsurprising as the one that organic structures not fitted to particular 
uses are not selected for or selectively retained. The sought relation between the concept of 
doorknobs and doorknobs is the relation of selection among given variants. It is non-cognitive 
                                                 
14 It seems similarly unclear how, if part of what’s innate about a concept is a specification of its “proprietary 
trigger” (ibid.: 138), we would know what trigger is “proprietary” if we do not know the concept it is proprietary 
for. 
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(and in this sense: brutely causal, though still not arbitrary), and it is non-instructive. This is a 
Darwinian-internalist response to the problem of concept acquisition, and a clear tension 
emerges in combining the view that the primary evolutionary mechanism is a selective one 
with the view that internal structures such as concepts are externally caused. 
 A concept may be like a key that opens a lock, but as in the case of other adaptive 
structures, the lock need not be referred to in explaining how the concept comes into 
existence.  
 
7. Possible Languages 
I have argued that concepts do not arise through content, though they can be individuated in 
terms of their possible content (or possible use), which varying environments then actualize. 
Put differently, while reference does not determine concepts, the environment provides 
external referents for concepts within a range of ways permitted by these concepts. This claim 
is testable, since the modalities used in this theoretical commitment imply that certain 
intentional relations would be such that we could not take them up, and that there would be 
CONCEPTS we could not learn, because we did not have, and could not, by the mere power 
of our will, develop the concepts needed for these CONCEPTS.  
To exemplify a test of this prediction, we may return to the theory of UG (see section 
4) as capturing the child’s concept of a possible language (itself involving concepts of a 
possible phoneme, word, concept, phrase, etc.), a concept as such not depending on any 
actual language spoken, though any actual instance of a possible language depends, by 
assumption, on it. As a structural type, UG commits us to the human impossibility of certain 
languages not obeying the constraints of that type. These latter languages would be logically 
possible (and constructible in the laboratory, so to speak), but the commitment is that they 
would not be natively learnable by children in the way that actual human languages are. 
Smith and Tsimpli’s (1995) experiments with Christopher, a prodigious language learner with 
severe cognitive deficits, who could not learn languages in which the experiments included 
some violation of a principle of UG, exemplifies just this.15 
While, of course, in some intuitive sense, children “learn” languages, it is an empirical 
question whether human languages are learnable in the sense required for externalist and 
empiricist learning theories. There is no constraint in human biology for languages to be 
learnable in the latter sense, just as there is no constraint in human biology for immune 
responses to be so learnable. On the view that language acquisition is rather enabled by UG – 
that is, UG is viewed as a “language acquisition device” or LAD – UG, as characterizing the 
child’s mind, provides “channels” within which experience is bound to flow. We know this 
acquisition process to be surprisingly independent of a large amount of feedback, corrections, 
and environmental control parameters, hence of hypothesis-testing in the Fodorian sense. 
Also in the case of the lexicon, the minor role that feedback and correction play in the child’s 
acquisition of a vocabulary, its effortlessness, speed, and essential uniformity, despite a great 
variance in scanty evidence and cultural background, and the little specificity of the sensory 
input needed, all conspire to suggest that this is the right conclusion, too. The inductive gap 
between the system of knowledge attained and the evidence on which this happens seems 
equally vast.16 
                                                 
15 Examples of “impossible words” in the sense of Hale and Keyser (2002) are another case in point. These are 
words derived in violation of a syntactic constraint, and hence not natively learnable (e.g., the invented transitive 
verb book as in *He booked on the shelf, with the meaning He put the books on the shelf. Still another case may 
be concepts that are impossible, not on syntactic, but on categorization grounds, such as the concept of a thing 
comprised of the four legs of a cow, which, as opposed to things like a flock or a hand that also consist of 
various parts, is not one unified thing for a creature with a conceptual system like ours. 
16 See further Bloom (2000), and Gleitman and Landau (1994). Chomsky (2000: 120) points to “the rate of 
lexical acquisition (...), with lexical items typically acquired on a single exposure, in highly ambiguous 
 16
One can describe the process of learning a language without bringing any 
representational notion of propositional attitude into play, of the sort that centrally figures in a 
Fodorian “Computational-Representational Theory of Mind”. The child (as opposed to the 
linguist) needs no more beliefs or a “theory” of which structures develop in its head and get 
selected than it does in the case of other biological organs. Nor does it need to represent the 
contents of such a theory. The relational notion of representation drops out of the conceptual 
framework of the theory of UG, as it is not clear how understanding of the language faculty 
and its use is enhanced by letting structures in the organism “represent” or “correspond” to 
constructs in the environment of which they are “true” (see also fn. 14). In short, the theory of 
the LAD as investigated in the biolinguistic framework gives relational notions of “content” 
or “propositional attitude” no explanatory role to play (see further Chomsky 2003a).   
Generative grammar in this way remains instructive for its lack of support for the 
hypothesis-testing model and the externalist idea of learning as based on representationally 
understood propositional attitudes. But it also teaches a philosophical moral regarding the 
“semanticality” of concepts in my sense: the range of conceptual structures determining a 
(humanly) possible language variant, while not being defined or generated relationally, are 
also not semantically inert. As I described it, they delineate a possible content. The concepts 
involved will not determine the contents of the child’s actual experiences – since it is a 
historical matter of what linguistic environments it will happen to be placed in – but it will 
determine what French, Bantu and German have in common. This is also a content (though a 
more abstract one), and not merely a “form”. It is in this sense that concepts in the sense of 
this paper, though they are part of the organism’s intrinsic structure and thus independent of 
an environment that the organism is placed in, have a “content”. They do not “reach out” to 
the world in the sense of determining whether French or German is spoken, but they have 
semanticality all the same.17   
8. Conclusions 
I have argued for the good use of a notion of ‘concept’ on which concepts enter into the 
explanation of meaningful reference and language use, while not being either intensions or 
worldly extensions. They do not come into existence through their functioning in an 
environment, nor do they cause their functioning. The origination of concepts and their 
functioning must be kept apart. Applying a Darwinian rather than Spencerian conception of 
progressive evolution to the case of concept and language learning thus suggests abandoning 
prevailing tendencies to regard the environment as a (direct or indirect) cause of our concepts. 
While externalism appears to be a general tendency in our intuitive thought, the empirical 
study of the human language faculty does not suggest, as of now, to give external function an 
explanatory role to play in the genesis of that part of our cognitive structure and design. A 
serious doubt concerning the explanatory significance of notions such as content, 
representation, and reference, appears warranted. 
The picture I have defended endorses nativism in the form of what amounts to a truism 
in a biological context: the organism’s response to the environment depends on its internal 
resources, and in a Darwinian frame of mind, internal cognitive structures will not generally 
arise from reference or function, or from standing in causal relations, alone. Nativism thus 
understood – a form of biological internalism as inaugurated in the 19th century (see 
Amundson 1998 and Gould 2002, Ch. 4) – gives rise to a basic conflict with current 
                                                                                                                                                        
circumstances, but understood in delicate and extraordinary complexity that goes vastly beyond what is recorded 
in the most comprehensive dictionary”. 
17 The older notion of a synthetic a priori judgement in the Kantian sense is what is needed here: the child’s 
judgements on what a possible human language is are a priori – they do not derive from experience – but they 
are not analytic, for they have a content in the sense just described: the structure of UG does provide substantive 
information, which follows from nothing in logic. 
 17
externalism, if the latter is to be more than the non-contentious claim that what our internal 
concepts end up being used to refer to is a matter of history, contingency, and chance.  
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